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Warfare and Welcome
Practicality and Qur’ānic Hierarchy in Ibāḍī Muslims’
Jurisprudential Rulings on Music
Bradford J. Garvey
And the instruments of entertainment that have no use
Outside of themselves are to be broken whenever they are found,
In all of their types that exist,
Because in this there is no benefit.
—‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd “Nūr al-Dīn” al-Sālimī (1286–1332/1869–1914) in the Jawhār al-Niẓām

Omani Orientations to the
Charge of “Music”
A few days before Ramadan began in
2016, I was sitting in my friend Ḥamad’s
majlis, a large sitting room adjacent to his
home, enjoying a ḥilba, a milky, fenugreekflavored drink. Over the course of the last
year or so, I had interviewed Ḥamad dozens
of times in his role as the manager of a local
men’s performance group that specialized
in the performance of a choral ode called
al-‘āzī and a war dance, al-razḥa. Though
my research was focused on the highly
charged exchange of praise poetry and
governmentally directed dispensation, I had
slowly come to realize the delicacy of the
religious toleration of these public praise
genres in Oman. The ‘āzī and the razḥa were,
in the eyes of most, expressions of Omani
pride, masculine solidarity, and communal
obligation. But that did not mean they were
not Islamically suspect, even here, in the
small, rural town of Manah in the Interior
region of the Sultanate of Oman.
Nestled in the southeast corner of the
Arabian Peninsula and boasting some three
million citizen-residents, the sultanate and
its various historical polities have remained
one of the few bastions of ’Ibādiyya, or

Ibādism, the third major branch of Islam.
Though no official population count exists,
the Interior province of the modern sultanate,
along with adjacent regions, was until the
1950s part of one of the longest-lasting
theocratic regimes in the world, called the
Ibāḍī Imamate. Overthrown by the current
sultan’s father in the late 1950s (despite
himself and all his line being nominally
Ibāḍī), the Imamate has cast a long shadow
over Oman’s historiography. I found myself
darting in and out of that long shadow
in interviews, poetry discussions, and
conversations with performers throughout
my year of researching men’s performance.
The tension around engaging in a
variety of performance genres—drumming,
dancing, singing—was palpable during my
research in many ways. Early on, I realized
that a direct approach to the music question
got me nowhere. In fact, framing my
research as studying “music” was met only
by furtive glances and unsure responses. Yes,
I was assured, there was “music” in Oman,
surely; Bedouins or “mountain folks” (‘and
al-jabāl) play “music,” that’s probably what
I meant. I quickly found out that the key
term was not music, or mūsīqā, but funūn—
the “arts.” The performance genres I studied
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were properly “arts,” not music. The reason
for this tentative response was, of course,
that Ibāḍīs had quite a dim view of “music.”
And yet, there I was, months into research
on a practice that was but was not musical.
And so we return to that day in Hamad’s
majlis, seated with our backs to the short,
threadbare couch that lined all four walls;
the beige, satiny gloss of the new paint
glinting in the strong fluorescent lighting;
the walls boasting hand-painted sūra-s of
the Qur’ān hanging amid floating palm trees
painted in permanent bloom. I was setting
out my notebook and recorder when Ḥamad
noticed a book on the status of music in
Islam sticking out of my bag.
“Oh, father,” he moaned, “what is this?”
“This?” I picked up the book. “This is a
book about Islamic jurisprudence . . . .”
“Well, I can see that, doctor. What do
you want with it [shtibā bih]?”
“I just wanted to know the opinions of
Ibāḍī scholars on music . . . .”
“That’s fine,” Ḥamad said, leaning back
and pulling his long white dishdāsha robe
over his feet, “but you’re not studying
‘music’ [mūsīqā]. If you want to know about
that, it’s not in razḥa. There’s no melody,
there’s no singing, there’s no instruments
[mā shay al-naghmāt, mā shay al-ghinā’, mā
shay al-ma‘āzif]. But I’m no scholar, don’t
ask me. I don’t know. Listen, I don’t want
to enter into that issue, I don’t even want
to enter into it [mū bāghī adakhkhalu]. The
razḥa is for warfare and welcome [al-ḥarb
wa-l-tarḥīb], that’s what I say to any imam.”
“That reminds me, why isn’t the razḥa
ever performed if a new mosque is opened?”
I asked facetiously, trying to corner him. I
had been studying the role of razḥa and
‘āzī in civil celebrations of governmental
generosity, and so the conspicuous absence
of praise poetry to celebrate the opening of
20

the hundreds of smaller mosques and the
dozens of huge jāmi‘ (one in each town,
all confusingly named the “Sultan Qaboos
Grand Mosque”) was very obvious to me
but brooked no comment from performers.
“Oh, lord spread blessings and mercy like
rain. That is a good question for the Islamic
scholars. I do not know.”
Months earlier, I was discussing some
of the local arts that were less well known
than the razḥa and the ‘āzī with Khamīs,
the leader of a new troupe in the town of
’Izkī. We were meeting in his ‘azba, a kind of
semipermanent camp and corral for grazing
stock, eating dates by the goat pen that he
affectionately referred to as the “UN” (“I’ve
got every type of goat in there,” he boasted,
“Indian, Pakistani, Sindhi, Afghan, Somali,
Kenyan, Nubian, Egyptian, Georgian,
Bosnian, Iraqi, Persian, Balochi, Roman, and
Chinese—it’s the UN of goats [al-’umum almutaḥḥida māl al-hūsh]”). After a half-hour
of chatting, a pickup full of Khamīs’s male
kin pulled up. We exchanged pleasantries
and they joined us in eating dates.
“We’re talking about music [mūsīqā],”
Khamīs said casually, flicking his eyes over
to his younger brother.
“The arts?” his brother replied.
“No, music,” he insisted., “This
Englishman wants to study music here.”
“Well, not music, God lengthen your
lives,” I jumped in. “I want to study the
arts. But we were chatting a bit about music
around here. Khamīs said that you all
perform al-rūgh in the early dusk?” Al-rūgh
is a genre of instrumental reed-pipe music
accompanied by drumming and some sung
poetry. The word rūgh refers to both the
genre and the reed-pipe, which is shaped and
played like the more common mijwiz. I have
never encountered any source that discusses
al-rūgh and so it may be a genre that is
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mostly performed by shawāwī (seminomadic
herders) performers, whose music is largely
undocumented in Western scholarship.
The area around ’Izkī is, however, home to
many rare and undocumented instruments,
including a kind of gourd resonator
monochord, a large family of African-derived
idiophones, and so on.
“Al-rūgh,” his brother chuckled, “that’s
the horn-pipe of Satan [mizmār al-shayṭān],1
that al-rūgh. The only thing worse is the zār.
Did you hear about the zār?” The zār is a
common name for a genre of healing music
mostly performed by and for women: as it
deals with metahumans like jinn, among
other supernatural beings, it is roundly
condemned by Islamic scholars.2
“Zār? You want to see a zār, doctor?”
Khamīs perked up. “Mizmār al-shayṭān, ha!
I hold a zār here every night. Zār and mizmār,
all night.” Of course, Khamīs did not hold a
performance of zār or rūgh every night, but
he was voicing an opinion contrary to his
brother’s take on the Islamic status of things
called music. Rather than acquiescing to the
putative illicit nature of some practices, as
Ḥamad would later do, Khamīs pushed back
against that discourse, claiming to embrace
a profoundly controversial genre of mūsīqā.
As these anecdotes show, Ibāḍī Omanis
express a wide range of discursive and
metadiscursive perspectives on the charge
of music, from those like Khamīs’s—that
embrace targeted sonic practices even in the
face of condemnation—to those that scorn
them.3 However, before we discuss particular
Ibāḍī perspectives on the issue of defining
“music,” we should outline the general stakes
of the debate over the status of artistically
engineered sound in Muslim discourse.
Such a foray bears a long pedigree: as just
one example, Amnon Shiloah introduces
the question as an “interminable debate” in

his Music in the World of Islam.4 “The debate
elicited views that varied from complete
negation to full admittance of all musical
forms and means, even dance,” Shiloah
writes, adding that “between these two
extremes we can find all possible nuances.”5
Oman, as we’ve seen, is no exception. Early
in my research, when I was not pursuing
Omanis’ perceptions of the Islamic status
of musical sounds, I nevertheless recorded a
wide range of beliefs. These often correlated
with the social and economic position of the
speaker: an official in the Omani Center for
Traditional Music told me that “that debate
is over, from the Middle Ages the scholars
agree that music is permitted”; a performer
of the Sufi-inflected6 mālid genre told me
that “rhythm [al-‘īqā‘] is a powerful tool
for religion, and must be used with care”; a
performer of the razḥa at the Muscat Festival
brought me a fatwa declaring attendance at
the Muscat Festival to be avoided if possible
because it included music (mūsīqā, “especially
from Bahrain,” he added).
In this article, I want to offer the
following two interventions in this muchdiscussed area: first, I want to positively
reassess Lois Ibsen al-Faruqi’s landmark
1985 article “Music, Musicians, and
Muslim Law” by engaging with her central
diagrammatic expression of Qur’ānic
hierarchy; and second, I want to highlight
an under-recognized aspect of Muslim
jurisprudential scholarship with regard
to a variety of sonic practices: the issue
of function and practicality. Rather than
criticizing or attempting to replace alFaruqi’s claims, I want to think positively
alongside her work in order to tease out
further dimensions of her linear model.
Adding the value dimension of practicality—
which I explore through recent Ibāḍī
scholarship—to her linear schematic model
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(and thereby pluralizing the relational
network between sonic practices and
Qur’ānic recitation) both allows a useful
co-conception7 of Islamic jurisprudential
scholarship on music and highlights a
heuristic mode often overlooked in previous
discussions. Specifically, I want to draw out
of al-Faruqi’s model a latent Dumontian8
premise: rather than a linear hierarchy of
gradual transformation from most similar
to least similar to Qur’ānic recitation,
recitation may be best understood as
“encompassing” other Islamically licit sonic
forms. Sonic practice might therefore exist—
in anthropologist Joel Robbins’s terms9—
within a plural value scheme, with any
specific practice tugged toward contrasting
polarities. In taking up the question of value
and modes of valuation, I engage the recent
revival in anthropological studies of value,10
and specifically the ongoing reevaluation
of the work of Louis Dumont applied to
cases outside of the Indian subcontinent.11
While Dumont’s work has encountered
serious critique in its applications to
actually existing social structures and value
regimes in South Asia,12 certain elements
of Dumont’s thinking have been usefully
applied to conceptual schemes as opposed
to social structure.13 In so engaging, I seek
not to champion one or another theoretical
approach, but to evaluate the purchase
afforded by value-oriented approaches
in examining a potent and historically
perduring conceptual hierarchy.
Starting “As Muslims Do,” Ending Up
Where We Started
Understanding how differently positioned
Muslims regard sonic practices requires
both
historical
and
ethnographic
engagement. To do this, we should begin,
in Talal Asad’s terms, “as Muslims do, from
22

the context of a discursive tradition that
includes and relates itself to the founding
texts of the Qur’an and the Hadith.”14 This
is precisely al-Faruqi’s initial point in her
article, published a year before Asad’s
remarks, in which she urges researchers
to utilize materials “that a consensus of
the Muslims themselves consider to be
authoritative in these matters.”15 The irony,
of course, is that starting “as Muslims do”
reveals precisely the core complexity of
discussing “music” and Islam: that there
is no obvious universal position. The only
sūra, or verse, in the entire Qur’ān that
scholars have argued refers directly to
“music” is Luqmān 6: “And of those people
who buy idle talk to lead [others] astray
from the path of God without knowledge,
and take it as mockery, they will [face] a
humiliating punishment.” The central term
in this sūra, “idle talk,” is a translation of
al-lahū al-ḥadīth, whose exact translation
has been subject to many opinions, as we
shall see. Indeed, this is why Asad promotes
studying Islam and Islamic practices
as “discursive traditions.”16 Practices are
constituted within discourses that relate to
past, present, and future, and are Islamic
insofar as they are practices that induct
persons as Muslims. An Islamic practice
so constituted, for Asad, is authorized as
orthodoxy. “Wherever Muslims have power
to regulate, uphold, require or adjust correct
practices,” Asad claims, “and to condemn,
exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect
ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy,”
which is “crucial to all Islamic traditions.”17
For our discussion here, we should recognize
that the “interminable debate” over the
legal status of any one sonic practice is
precisely the kind of discursive tradition to
which Asad is drawing attention. However,
despite Asad’s claim of the constant push for
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orthodoxy (and orthopraxy), the status of
certain practices remains doggedly murky.
This situation is noted by historian
Shahab Ahmed when he criticizes Asad’s
notion of Islam as a tradition in What Is
Islam? Troubled by Asad’s identification
of the push to orthodoxy as the core
of Islamic practices, Ahmed concludes
that it is incorrect “to put forward a
schema where the definitive purpose
of the discursive tradition/Islam is the
production of orthodoxy.”18 Ahmed
instead argues that, at least within what he
terms the “Balkans-to-Bengal complex,” a
“temporal-geographical entity” stretching
from Sarajevo to Dhaka, a huge range of
discursive practices have flourished—
“Avicennan philosophy, Akbarian Sufism,
Suhrawardīan Illuminationism, Ḥāfiẓian
poetics, figural painting and winedrinking”—practices that never strive for
orthodoxy, embrace complexity, but are
nevertheless “at the very center of the
discursive tradition” and hence Islam.19
One of Ahmed’s strongest statements of
this fact comes from analyzing the musical
life of Amīr Khusraw, the famed inventor of
qawwālī (650–725/1253–1325). Noting
that music is rarely considered “Islamic,”
he shows that despite this, “in the selfstatement of Muslims, we find that music
is made meaningful precisely in . . . Islamic
terms.”20 Ahmed claims that Khusraw’s
heterodox and anti-authoritarian “couplets
on music constitute and make normative
statements that are at once philosophy,
Sufism, theology, Qur’ānic exegesis and
law” and hence take part in the “discursive
tradition” as much as any scholars seeking
orthodoxy. What Ahmed articulates is
the plurality of values that might animate
Islamic practice in one or another of the
varied contexts in which Muslims have

constituted themselves as Muslims: poetry
exegesis, esoterica, musical rapture, and so
on. Orthodoxy hangs less as a North Star
and more as point in a complex constellation.
In Oman and among Ibāḍīs, what is
interesting about the outcome of this
debate over the status of certain sonic
practices is not that Muslims do not seek
orthodoxy and orthopraxy, since they
decidedly do. Rather, the avowedly Islamic
conclusions of the debate admit the
performance of controversial practices—
the ‘āzī and the razḥa—for controversial
reasons. In ‘āzī, a lead singer sing-recites a
formal, monorhymed ode on a given topic,
most often praising local leaders, while a
choral group sings antiphonal responses
and plays drum rolls. The razḥa, on the
other hand, is a circle dance that involves
lines of dancers trading lines of sung
poetry, coordinated by a pair of drums.
These practices are linked to each other in
that they are both performed by the same
group of men but are also conceptually
associated with warfare. Poems sung in
each often deal with belligerence, violence,
bravery, and the glories of combat, inciting
the participants to courage in arms. Neither,
as I have noted, is considered “mūsīqā,”
but then neither is considered wholly
Islamically licit. Here, Ibāḍī charges of
“music” are not simply a matter of applying
or constructing an orthodoxy under which
everything is either accepted or not, as
Asad would have it; nor do legal scholars
merely privilege the capacity of practices
to “have meaning” for Muslims over and
above the desires of centralized power, as
would Ahmed. Instead, we can see a strong
pragmatic thread, attending closely to
context and wary of the ramifications of
overzealous condemnation. Rather than
trying to establish an Ibāḍī “doctrine” on
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sonic practices, we can use Ibāḍī writings
and fatwas to trace their shifting role in
the lives of Omani Muslims. As we shall
see, historically, the razḥah and the ‘āzī
seem to have been tolerated because
they were technologies of warfare—and
insofar as they supported war, they were
deeply connected to statecraft, elites, and
leadership. They are tolerated merely

because they are practical: they serve some
explicit, useful purpose for Ibāḍīs.
Music and Muslim Law, Redux; or,
A Chain of Beings of Decreasing Dignity
Al-Faruqi’s classic investigation of the status
of music in Islam (writ broadly) presents
a hierarchy of “sound art expressions”

Figure 1. The Qur’ānic hierarchy. A linear vertical representation of the relative
legal ranking of various sound-art expressions by Muslim legal scholars. Qur’ānic
recitation occupies the highest value position, and all others are related by way of
decreasing Islamic legitimacy. Other value orderings can be read into sections of the
diagram, such as the role of words or the voice, the inculcation of emotional states,
or the presence of musical instruments. Adapted from al-Faruqi 1985, 8.
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(handasah al-ṣawt) that are arranged in
relation to two poles whose statuses are
clear.21 I reproduce this linear model in
Figure 1. At the top of the hierarchy lies
the most legitimate form of handasah alṣawt: Qur’ānic recitation (qirā’a), and at
the bottom is “sensuous music associated
with unacceptable contexts.”22 Virtually all
Islamic scholars are in agreement on the
position of these two forms. In al-Faruqi’s
hierarchy, she places Qur’ānic recitation
and religious chants that are a “duty to
believers” (adhān, tahlīl/ṭalbiyyah, etc.)
above poems with noble themes and a
variety of occasional musics. Conceptually
“below” these are the controversial genres of
art song, improvisations, non-Islamic, and
sensuous music.
Al-Faruqi concludes that the intention
of the hierarchy was not to “destroy all
sound-art,” but rather to submit musical
pleasure to higher ethical standards.23 She
argues that “a number of interrelated aspects
seem to have been involved in determining
the implicit hierarchy of sound-art that is
described here.”24 However, the four aspects
she picks out (conformity with Qur’ānic
chant; conformity with the “aesthetic
demands of the culture”; community
acceptance or esteem; and “conformance in
sound-art to the moral demands of Islam”)
do not seem to imply a unidirectional—or
monist, following Robbins—organizational
hierarchy.25 Al-Faruqi posits that formal
similarity to Qur’ānic recitation is the
metric by which sonic practices are aligned:
those like Qur’ānic chant are next in line
below it, those that are less similar further
away, and so on. One reason this valuation
by similarity works is that the forms and
stylistic features of Qur’ānic recitation are
often strategically employed by capable
performers, and astute listeners evaluate

such employments with considerable
nuance. Virginia Danielson points to the
repertory of Umm Kulthum as one example
of an explicit link between Qur’ānic
recitation and Arabic song. Specific features
like nasalization, hoarseness or baḥḥaḥ,
and a full and deliberate pronunciation
of emphatic, velar, and uvular consonants
were all used by Umm Kulthum in order
to evoke recitation in her performances of
poetic texts.26 However, while this seems to
hold for those sonic practices that al-Faruqi
sees as closely related to the Qur’ān as well
as serious metered song, where does this
leave lullabies, works songs, and military
parades?
Here, I want to turn to a useful tool
of structural analysis that has seen some
recent rehabilitative theoretical work:
Louis Dumont’s notion of hierarchy,
and specifically that of “hierarchical
opposition.”27 Hierarchical opposition
refers to a value relation that is measured
between “a set or whole and an element
of that set or whole.”28 This nesting of
values is regarded as revealing “levels” of
value, heuristically described as “higher” or
“lower.” The crucial feature of hierarchical
opposition is that relatively higher values
encompass relatively lower values, in this
sense meaning that higher values include
as part of their value those lower ones as
well (as in the Euler diagram in Figure 2).
Lower values are recognized as supporting
higher values, as deriving their value
from just a part or parts of higher values.
Nevertheless, since they offer a value
dimension that is distinct from a higher
one, they are considered “contradictory.”29
We can operationalize this in our discussion
of the Qur’ānic hierarchy by pointing out
that Qur’ānic recitation does not serve as
a performative model for other Islamically
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Encompassing, Cardinal,
or Higher-value:

Encompassed or
Lower-value:

Qur’ānic recitation

Practicality

Figure 2: Dominance hierarchy. A depiction of the
encompassing and encompassed values within any
Dumontian hierarchy, here the Qur’ānic hierarchy.
Adapted from Dumont by way of Leonhard Euler.

licit genres to mimic; rather, it provides a
cardinal
value
which
they are
ultimately
Figure 2: Dominance
hierarchy.to
A depiction
of the encompassing
and encompassed
values
within any Dumontian hierarchy, here the Qur’ānic hierarchy. Adapted from Dumont by way 30
of
ordinated,
subordinated, and coordinated.
Leonhard Euler.
The question of whether Qur’ānic
recitation acts as a monist “supervalue”
that encompasses all others can be
approached by way of Joel Robbins’s
pluralist conception of Dumont’s notion of
hierarchy.31 Dumont writes that hierarchy
is not “a great chain of beings of decreasing
dignity,” which Robbins interprets as
Dumont’s recognition of the potential
plurality of values exposed in differing
contextual relations.32 Robbins continues
by pointing out that “chains in which
successive elements are distinguished by
decreasing amounts of a single valued
feature are clearly organized by a single
value” and hence fail to regard other,
concurrent, crosscutting plural values that
may spring into importance within various
concrete contexts.33 Such values may be
quite diverse and contextually specific.
As Jonathan Glasser has recently argued,
“[Dumontian] hierarchy presupposes a
segmentation of values: social worlds
are suffused by diverse and extendable
rankings that can come into complex,
overlapping, and intertwined relation with
26

one another.”34 Musicians may be regularly
subordinated in wider society and occupy
rather low-status positions even though the
skills they possess may make them—under
certain conditions—immensely valuable
to power, say, for purposes of propaganda,
playing dance music, enlivening feasts
and festivals, accompanying parades, and
so on. While the “cardinal value” of any
social structure may be something like
patrilineal descent from the Prophet, on
certain occasions, this higher value makes
room for musicians and other skilled
laborers to be contextually highly valued.
The value attributed to any one practice
in the Qur’ānic hierarchy that al-Faruqi
tracks may or may not be fully realized by
the dimension of similarity. I follow Naomi
Haynes and Justin Hickel in concluding that
what is most useful in tracking hierarchical
arrangements is the “way that they reveal
particular ideological arrangements, that is,
topographies of value.”35
If the perfection of Qur’ānic recitation
for Muslims is not approximated in
Ottoman mehter military marches, nor yet
in Omani ‘āzī or razḥa, or lullabies or work
songs or poetry with noble themes for that
matter—then what makes these practices
valuable, that is, licit, is that they are not
made to oppose the higher value of recitation,
but are, in fact, held to be subordinate to
and supportive of it. The overriding value of
the recitation of the Qur’ān and the values
to which that practice points for listeners
“makes room,” in some sense, for other
practices that might be evaluated along
different but supervened value dimensions.
Nested levels of “reverse supervenience”
are the very stuff of Dumontian hierarchy.
In other words, lower levels of difference
are determined and shaped by—and must
ultimately be cashed out in terms defined
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by—higher levels. Rather than higher levels
of value relying on lower ones for coherence,
lower ones rely on higher ones. Practitioners
can perform and value lower-level sonic
practices in circumscribed contexts and
otherwise regard them as safely inferior to
or dependent on the recitation of the Qur’ān.
Figure 3 is a diagram that I propose
as a co-conception with al-Faruqi’s: here,

rather than expressing one hierarchical
spectrum, I choose to break apart the model
into independent practices in order to track
value segmentation. The upper purple
field represents the “highest value level” of
recitation. The grey circles carved out of that
field are two potential contradicting lower
values—similarity and practicality. Rather
than trying to fit lullabies or work songs into

Figure 3. Relational-hierarchical model of the Qur’ānic hierarchy. In this model, the linear descending order
is broken into various “lower”-value dimensions, which I have provisionally named similarity, practicality,
corruptability, and apostasy. I only explore the value dimension of practicality here. Specifically, what this model
displays is that each practice is not fitted somewhere along a monist continuum of similarity, but is evaluated against
Qur’ānic recitation as a “higher” or encompassing value. The purple field represents the capacity of Qur’ānic chant
to define the total value landscape of any non-mūsīqā practice and the grey circles represent the delimited domains
of lesser values that operate within that space. The lower diagram, or mūsīqā section, is provisional—a polar model
of the Qur’ānic hierarchy would necessarily include recitation’s obverse, that is, sensuous music. The dotted lines
represent the potential of mūsīqā practices to be encompassed not by recitation, but by sensuous music instead.
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a monist descending scheme, pluralizing the
model allows us to more fully explore the
exceptions and legal specificities that allow
practical genres to flourish as legitimate
ones despite sharing little in common with
other licit genres. Nevertheless, everything
here is ultimately “reduced” to the positions
they occupy within al-Faruqi’s model.
Taking apart the linear model allows us to
track relations between the various entities
as encompassed by Qur’ānic recitation, or,
the obverse, as potentially encompassed by
sensuous music. In this model, sensuous
music operates not so much as a category
drained of all the elements of Qur’ānic
recitation, but as a polar opposite to it, as
a potential encompassing value to which
some practices may be oriented instead.
While I won’t dwell on this potential here,
the threat of sensuous music’s capacity to
encompass certain genres of undecided
legality may help explain their medial
position in al-Faruqi’s diagram. Rather than
a unidirectional decline in value, we have a
contestation. What this model exposes, I
think, is that similarity is one value vector
amongst many by which Omani Ibāḍī
Muslims implicitly and explicitly experience
this value hierarchy. Hence, similarity to
recitation may be operant in some cases
as a mode by which sonic practices are
encompassed within the Qur’ānic hierarchy,
but it may coexist alongside many others.
The relational-hierarchical model thus
exposes the “level” at which other values
may operate within the entire hierarchy. In
this case, I pick out but one, practicality,
and show how it more parsimoniously
explains the licit nature of what al-Faruqi
describes as “occupational music,” “life cycle
music,” and—my special focus in the next
section—“military music.” Similarity is the
wrong value to explain these cases, but in
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a linear model this subtlety is subsumed to
explanation via a higher value. Practicality
may never be important at higher levels of
valuation, but it does come into play—and
quite specifically in the case of the ‘āzī and
the razḥa in Oman. Now we shall turn to
the evidence that points to practicality as a
“lower value” in the Qur’ānic hierarchy of
sonic practices.
“Devotion Is a Wide Door”: Islam, Ibāḍī
Pragmatism, and the “Problem” of
Useful Music
In this section, I want to first draw out
the seriousness with which Ibāḍī scholars
condemn practices called “music” in
order to contextualize the importance of
embracing practicality as a value in genres
that bear no resemblance to Qur’ānic
recitation—specifically, sounds organized
for war. When we look at Ibāḍī scholars’
judgments pertaining to musical sound,
one contemporary scholar’s work stands
out: Khālid bin ‘Īsā bin Ṣāliḥ al-Sulaymānī’s
Al-ghinā’ wa al-ma‘āzif f ī al-mayzān: qirā’a
f ī al-aḥkām al-fiqhiyya al-mut‘aliqa bi alghinā’ wa al-ma‘āzif wa ḥukumhumā f ī alislām (Singing and Musical Instruments
in the Balance: A Study on Jurisprudential
Judgments Pertaining to Singing and
Musical Instruments and Their Judgment
in Islam).36 Al-Sulaymānī gives an overview
of the debate surrounding singing and
musical instruments first by looking at the
Qur’ān and the “pure sunna” (Ibāḍīs regard
only a small selection of ḥadīth-s as “pure”),
then by taking up a philological approach
to the definition of the key terms “singing”
(al-ghinā’) and “the playing of musical
instruments” (al-ma‘āzif). These two
terms are often used in conjunction with
each other in the Islamic jurisprudence
on music, referring at least in general to
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“singing” and “musical instruments and the
playing of musical instruments.”
Al-ghinā’ and al-ma‘āzif

Al-Sulaymānī writes that “singing” (al-ghinā’)
is a “polluted word” (kalima mulawwitha)
due to its association with “those that draw
from singing a craft and profession; and
those that bring to it musical instruments
that move/agitate the spirit, that arouse
passionate love and obscenity.”37 It is for
this reason that “those with common sense
are on their guard against using the word
‘singing’ (al-ghinā’) and avoid it, and they
replace it with other words such as the word
inshād.”38 Such a shift in vocabulary does not
change the status of music that is already
“polluted.” “If we come to the general
meaning of the word al-ghinā’ among the
Arabs,” al-Sulaymānī continues, it has come
to refer only to “al-ghinā’ al-mājin (‘immoral
singing’).” 39 Al-Sulaymānī concludes by
firmly distinguishing between al-ghinā’ almubāḥ and al-ghinā’ al-muḥarram. Mubāḥ
(permissible) in Islamic jurisprudence means
something that is permitted but for which
there is neither reward nor punishment:
something toward which one ought to
cultivate indifference. Al-ghinā’ al-mubāḥ for
al-Sulaymānī “is chaste, modest, respectable,
authentic singing, free from the traces of
indecency and which is not accompanied
by musical instruments and the forbidden
ṭarab. This type is now classified under the
name inshād.”40 These include the categories
that we have modeled as licit: lullabies, work
songs, military marches, and so on. As for
al-ghinā’ al-muḥarram, al-Sulaymānī quotes
Māliki scholar Abū ‘Abdullah al-Qurṭabī
(610–671/1214–1273):
It is immoral singing . . .[as al-Qurṭabī
said] it is “singing which agitates
the spirits and that arouses them to

passionate love, amorous poetry and
obscenity . . . which moves the still and
reveals the hidden . . . this is that type
of singing if it has poetry that celebrates
[women in verse] by mentioning women
and descriptions of their beauties, and
mentioning wine and other forbidden
things upon which there is no difference
[of opinion among scholars] in their
being forbidden . . . As for what the Sufis
have created these days it is from an
addiction to listening to the sung [samā‘
al-mughannī] and the instruments of
ṭarab.”41

As we saw above, at some point the last
definition, that is, singing being associated
with immorality, became the most commonly
used definition of al-ghinā’. Other types
of singing used to be referred to as ghinā’,
including the Islamically licit genres of
wedding/life-cycle and occupational music.
Over time, however, for many Islamic
scholars, the word ghinā’ itself has come to
represent all that is negative in vocal music.
Al-ma‘azif, in a similar process, has
come to refer to all musical instruments
and the playing of them. Early definitions,
such as those compiled by Ibn Manẓūr (d.
711/1312), indicate that al-ma‘āzif referred
only to the playing of instruments, not the
instruments themselves, equating it with
malāhī, or “entertainment.” Later scholars
amended the meaning of al-ma‘āzif to
include musical instruments as objects.42
Ibāḍī Pragmatism: Condemnation and
Conciliation

When al-Sulaymānī shifts his focus to
presenting the perspectives of Ibāḍī
perspectives on music, he is unequivocal:
The reader of the books of Ibāḍī scholars
that treat the question of singing
and musical instruments and what is
related to them (in the judgment of
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jurisprudential scholars) finds that
Ibāḍism is among the harshest of all
the Islamic schools in condemning
singing and its instruments. There is no
difference among Ibāḍī scholars and their
rulings, neither in the past nor in the
present, on the question of forbidding
singing and musical instruments. Rather,
their statements on the two are the most
ruthless of all statements, and they
consider the two among the greatest sins
and most reprehensible actions.43

Such is the position espoused by Muḥammad
bin ’Ibrāhīm al-Kindī, cited above: “listening
to entertainment is disobedient, sitting
among it is sinfulness, and working in it is
apostasy (of ungratefulness towards God’s
blessings, kufr al-nu‘ama).”44 Many Ibāḍī
scholars have interpreted this kind of harsh
judgment as permitting the destruction of
instruments as a means of defense against
them. The breaking of instruments is a
common behavior cultivated in “enjoining
the right and forbidding the wrong.” Such
a statement is recorded by the eleventh-/
seventeenth-century Ibāḍī scholar Shaykh
Muḥammad bin ‘Abdullah bin Jum‘a bin
‘Abīdān al-Nizwī:
As for the dahra/daïre and the mizmār-s
and all the instruments of entertainment,
it is permitted for you to break them if
you are able, if they are used or not. As
for the dahra/daïre, the āṣnāj [cymbals]
and zamārāt, they are to be broken
wherever found, used or not. As for the
reed instrument [qaṣba], as it has been
said: “when it is used and there is singing
with it” . . . as for the duff-s, if they are
used outside of the month of marriage,
then they are to be broken.45

Another instrument mentioned by the Ibāḍīs,
more familiar in Central Asia, is the ṭunbūr.
Interestingly, Mūsā bin Ābī Jābir al-Manḥī
(of Manaḥ, d. 181/797) writes that one
has “permission to leave it unbroken ‘if it
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was without adornment’ [’idha kān li-ghayr
zayna], [though] if the value of the ṭunbūr
seemed high, then most scholars permitted
breaking it ‘even if it was of great value.’”46
Ibāḍīs were careful to condemn not
just their own music, but that of Africans,
British subjects, and Indians as well.47
British imperial officers stationed in Muscat
noted in 1869 that the influence of Sa‘īd
bin Khalfān al-Khalīlī, an Ibāḍī scholar,
had reached such a level that he outlawed
the weekly music sessions of the Siddi-s (a
population derived from enslaved Africans)
in the capital.48 Similarly, the British political
agent in Muscat had to intervene when Ibāḍī
leaders requested that he prevent his Indian
subjects from
beating drums or playing musical
instruments. Disbrowe [the political
agent in Muscat] refused to heed the
request. Instead, he replied that if these
activities were restricted [to] hours when
it is unreasonable or caused disturbance,
then an understanding could be reached
between the two sides. [Imam] ‘Azzān
in his reply stated that music was to be
banned at all times and no concession
would be made to British subjects.49

‘Azzān’s time as imam was predicated on his
opposition to imperial ingresses in Oman
and his call to reassert the religious basis of
the Imamate.
The essential statement on music for
our purposes, however, is a qaṣīda written
by the famed Imam ‘Abdullah bin Ḥumayd
“Nūr al-Dīn” al-Sālimī (1286–1332/1869–
1914) in the Jawhār al-Niẓām fī ‘ilmī al’adyān wa-l-aḥkām (The Jewel of Order in
the Science of Religions and Judgments), a
collection of poems and prose sections that
gather and expound on Ibāḍī Islamic themes.
Nūr al-Dīn was one of the most prolific and
popular scholars of the Ibāḍī renaissance of
the late nineteenth century, and his poems
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are widely read, bought, memorized, and
interpreted today—virtually any library or
bookstore in Oman contains his work. In
the section entitled “Book of the Order of
the World,” in the subsection “Enjoining the
Right and Forbidding the Wrong,” he writes
the following lines:
And the instruments of entertainment
that have no use
Outside of themselves are to be
broken whenever they are found,
In all of their types that exist,
Because in this there is no benefit.
Bin Maḥbūb told us about his compatriot;
That he played a drum with no mind
to it.
And in their telling, he [Bin Maḥbūb]
rent the leather [of the drumheads]
And that is incumbent upon any of
the proper [Muslims].
And they are not permitted to play the
drum
For entertainment—but for two “just
meanings”:
And that is the terrorization of enemies,
And as a response to the distant cries
[of communication],
And as a call to the prayers of the festival
[al-‘īd]
Or to a serious and purposeful
meeting between them [Muslims].50

Nūr al-Dīn once again demonstrates the
harsh Ibāḍī injunction to destroy musical
instruments. What this passage shows
most clearly, however, is the pragmatic
Ibāḍī interest in function and uselessness.
The poet’s main criticism of music and
musical instruments in this passage is that
the instruments of entertainment are to
be broken “because in [them] there is no
benefit” and they “have no use outside of
themselves.” Al-Sulaymānī adds that musical
instruments are “not [the kind of things]
that are benefited from.”51 When the “two

‘just meanings’” for using instruments are
provided, they are clearly phrased in terms
of function: insofar as drums are useful
in times of war (to terrorize enemies and
coordinate soldiers) and peace (to gather
the Muslims to festival and consultation),
they are permitted. This is a clear expression
of what al-Faruqi presented as the hierarchy
of handasa al-ṣawt, but the justification of it
is presented in terms not of the practice’s
similarity to the recitation of the Qur’ān,
but of its benefit to believers in other ways.
The current grand muftī of the Sultanate
of Oman, Aḥmad bin Ḥamad al-Khalīlī,
has issued several fatwas about music
and echoes his predecessors very closely.
Condemnation should be the general stance,
but bets are hedged. The general Ibāḍī
interpretation of music contends that the
“al-lahū al-ḥadīth” mentioned in Luqmān 6
refers to music, musical instruments, the
purchase or renting of music, and nearly
everything else related to it. In an undated
fatwa issued by the muftī, he summarizes
the Ibāḍī position:
Al-lahū is impermissible [yaḥram allahū] when it pulls to it corruption
and emits iniquity. Its impermissibility
is evidenced by the true speech of the
Most High: “And of those people who
buy idle talk to lead [others] astray from
the path of God without knowledge”
[Luqmān 6]. Al-lahū al-ḥadīth in this
verse is “singing,” as narrated by the
learned interpreter and translator of
the Qur’ān Ibn ‘Abbās—God’s mercy
upon him. Thus it was told about the
Prophet—may God send prayers and
peace—through the telling of twelve
of his followers, of [his] prohibition of
singing and playing and instruments
[al-ghinā’ wa-l-‘azif wa-l-zamr]. Despite
this, scholars have permitted, in the
case of war, what inspires ḥamās [vigor,
enthusiasm] in the believers and
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strengthens their resolves. However,
war songs [inshād-s] that carry ḥamās
are conditional provided they do not
come at the expense of religious duties,
such as impeding the duty to remember
God and the duty of prayer; surely, God
knows best.52

Here we have a good example of the capacity
of Qur’ānic recitation (and the values
within which it is situated) to encompass
a contradicting lower value: war songs are
tolerated “provided they do not come at the
expense of religious duties.” Once again,
function outweighs the doctrinal slashand-burn prohibition of music. Music
is, in fact, too useful to ban completely.
Practicality is valued at one level but cannot
overwhelm the cardinal value of the Qur’ān
and Islamic duty. In my discussions of this
with another religious scholar, he explained
to me that non-Muslims often think that
Muslims ban alcohol and music without
exception: “In fact,” he pointed out, “alcohol
and music are common. Why? Because you
need alcohol for cleaning, chemistry, for
useful things [ashiyā’ muf īda] like perfume.
It is the same with music. It is not ḥarām
without exception—if it is useful and
beneficial to the Muslim, he must use and
benefit from it.”
The definition of permitted sonic art for
Ibāḍīs is also quite wide—as al-Faruqi notes,
it is only that music which is most strongly
associated with immoral settings that is
uniformly denounced. In a 2005 fatwa,
the muftī also commented on a variety of
inshād-s that were sent to him. The letter
and response read:53
July 2005 / Jumādā al-thānī 1426 Fatwa
In the name of God, the merciful, the
compassionate. His Eminence the Shaykh
/ ’Āḥmad bin Ḥamad al-Khalīlī the
Venerable Grand Muftī of the Sultanate:
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Peace be upon you, and God’s blessings
and mercy,
The included attachment with the
letter is a group of inshād-s that include
various vocal expressions. Since the
controversy among people has increased
around [music’s] judgment according
to the Sharia, we submit it to your
Eminence, seeking from you the blessing
of notifying us as to its status.
The attachment is ordered as follows:
1. Al-duff?
2. Western music/rhythm? [al-‘īqā’ algharbī]
3. Sea music with or without interlocking
clapping?
4. Invigorating military music?
5. Melismata [Āhāt]—by a natural
human voice?
6. Melismata by sampler (a human voice
entered into a computer, then used in
performance)?
7. Autotune (a human voice entered into
a computer and purified to become sharp,
free from melodic impurities)?
8. Vocal alternatives (a human voice
entered into a computer which then
undergoes editing until it becomes like
another voice)?
9. Bass [al-bayz] (a rough voice
accompanying music/rhythm either
human or nonhuman)?
The answer: It is well known that
devotion is a wide door. So he who
is prudent leaves [unmolested] the
nonprohibited—that is most safe and
forthright. As for the judgment, I do
not find in what has been presented
in these expressions something that
is forbidden except for Western
music, insofar as it is in imitation
of nonbelievers, and sea music with
interlocking clapping due to the
clapping. Surely God knows best.54

In this letter, values that we might imagine
to be central (such as the unmodulated
human voice) are not regarded as interesting,
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whereas “Western music/rhythm” remains
as clearly condemned, as al-Faruqi’s diagram
makes clear.
Nevertheless, the contemporary Omani
state has embraced certain aspects of
“Western music,” establishing highland
bagpipe regiments in the army, multiple
orchestras, compulsory music education
in primary classrooms, and, most recently,
opening the Royal Opera House in 2011.
Ethnomusicologists Anne Rasmussen and
Majid al-Harthy have documented the
Omani state’s huge investment in music
and the arts more generally.55 This official
support of both music and its official Ibāḍī
condemnation has largely been understood
as reflecting the personality of the former
sultan, who is said to love European music.
The Opera House has witnessed a number
of minor protests over the years for “unIslamic” activities, such as an event in 2013
in which verses of the Qur’ān were read
or sung during a live jazz performance.56
At the same time, the government has
long patronized the dozens of traditional
performance groups that specialize in a
variety of local arts, whose status is at the
very least questionable (such as the “sea
music” in the letter above).
Is “Music” Useful or Useless?

What emerges from the preceding discussion
most clearly is (1) that proscriptions on
individual sonic practices made by Ibāḍīs
are very fine-grained, and (2) that a crucial
deciding factor is whether or not the practice
or instrument serves a discrete and necessary
social function. Hence, while musical
instruments are broadly impermissible,
commonly held exceptions exist to preserve
what is useful and beneficial. Similarly,
practices that are considered to have no use
or benefit are prohibited. One example of

this kind of thinking is given by al-Nabahānī
when he writes that the large qaṣba (“reed,”
flute) was “beneficial in remembering the
hereafter (or death in another reading). It
was reported about al-Wuḍāḥ bin ‘Aqaba
[fl. 237/851] that his son Ziyād saw him
listening to the sound of the large qaṣba
while crying.”57
This practical mode of thinking in
religious matters was reported by Mandana
Limbert in her ethnographic research
on sociality in Bahlā’ as well.58 However,
Limbert notes the reverse: older Bahlawis
considered social visiting to be an aspect of
pious living, while “being social, younger
Bahlawis argued, was a distraction from the
constant remembering of God” and therefore
ought to be condemned.59 “Thus,” Limbert
continues, “rather than considering this
sociality to be ‘proper’ (that is, religiously
sanctioned), younger Bahlawis argued that
it was useless (ghayr nafa’a), a waste of time,
and thus a sin.”60 Rather than the usefulness
of a practice determining its acceptability,
it is the uselessness of an action (within a
certain discourse) that condemns it. Despite
protestations that visiting might, in fact,
be a kind of work (shughl), its frivolity is
enough to make it sinful. Limbert notes
that philosopher Oliver Leaman traces this
tendency of equating “uselessness” with
sin back to the third-/tenth-eleventhcentury Islamic jurist ‘Abd al-Jabbar, who
first presented the uselessness of an action
as “sufficient condition of its evilness,”
whatever the consequences.61 If, as ‘Abd alJabbar claims, “everything has value because
there is a purpose behind its existence,” then
“anything which is not in accordance with
this purpose must be evil. The performance
of a useless action must be objectionable
on such a view, since it involves acting as
though there were no all-encompassing
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purpose at work in creation.”62 Despite the
high-mindedness of this claim, for Omanis
the concept of uselessness is a very everyday
one. A common saying among Omanis when
evaluating something is to say “mā yaṣlaḥ,”
which means both “it’s not proper” and “it’s
not usable, not practicable,” or the opposite,
“yaṣlaḥ,” meaning “it is fitting, serviceable,
or useful.” The Omani proverb gald al-fi’r
mā yaṣlaḥ l-al-raḥmānī (literally, “A mouse’s
hide isn’t useful/enough to skin a raḥmānī
drum”) is used to refer to meager attempts
to solve a big problem. Encouragements
to drink more water, juice, or coffee, to eat
more, or to use incense are accompanied by
the phrase “it will benefit you” (yistafīdak).
After many interviews and performances,
I was asked, “Did you benefit from it?”
(tistafīd minnu?). Discussing the moral
dangers of coffee and coffee consumption in
Bahlā’, Limbert cites a jurisprudential qaṣīda
poem by the scholar Mājid bin Khamīs al‘Abrī (1252–1340/1836/37–1921/22),
who “simply notes that there is nothing
wrong with coffee and that its effects are not
harmful, but rather useful.”63
Legitimating the Drums of War

This circumscribed commitment to
practicality is what allows the ‘āzī and the
razḥa to flourish in contemporary Oman.
“It is noteworthy that the attitudes of the
[Ibāḍī] jurists are not uniformly hardline,”
writes Michael Cook, and that “the single
most prominent motive behind the softer
views is military.”64 Cook notes that chess
might be roundly condemned and yet could
be allowed in the case of military instruction,
that “male shrieking” was illegitimate as
“a residue of the [pre-Islamic] Jāhiliyya”
though it could be legitimate when it
functioned as a “war-cry intended to rally
the troops and strike fear into the enemy.”65
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The same Muslim jurist notes that “it may
then be permitted, though his preference
would be for the use of the Islamic war-cry
‘God is greatest!’”66 Even more shocking,
some Omani imams seemed to have toyed
with the idea of permitting expressly
forbidden actions if they occurred during
war. Once again, while practicality wins
out at one level—justifying a war-cry—the
legal scholar nevertheless would prefer not
to have to make such a diversion to a lower
level of value. Al-Nabahānī notes the same
process regarding drums in the Interior:
“it seems,” he offers, “that drums acquired
their legitimacy from some Islamic scholars
due to the effect they had during war and
in meeting the enemy.”67 Al-Nabahānī
continues that “Shaykh Khamīs bin Sa‘īd alShaqṣī [ca. 1030s–1090s/1620s–1680s)]
confirms that [legitimacy] when he said:…
‘In our days, the drum is not considered
shameful [lā yistaqbaḥ al-ṭabl] especially
if it was a time of war, in a parade at the
[military?] camps, and perhaps as a sign or
notice of that.”68 Al-Shaqṣī concludes that
“each time period and people has its own
legal judgment,” and al-Nabahānī astutely
notes that this is perhaps written with a
sense of resignation. Al-Shaqṣī was active
during a period in which the Imamate was
struggling to repel the invaders and contain
internal separatist movements: “a time of
the wars to unify the nation and throw out
the occupying Portuguese.”69 Anticolonial
necessities prompted a vigorous, if qualified,
acceptance of the drums of war.
While warfare seems to draw even the
most condemnatory scholars into a more
pragmatic mode, it is worth pointing out that
none of the razḥa-s I recorded, participated
in, or witnessed were related to the actual
prosecution of war. Instead, razḥa-s were
generally linked to war by way of their
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production of ḥamās, a heightened state of
vigor, enthusiasm, and élan associated with
fighting or conflict. Inducing ḥamās, then,
was the practical function of the razḥa, which,
in turn, was linked to warfare. Ḥamās is a
complex phenomenon with considerable
historical precedent that I cannot engage
here. Nevertheless, this juncture is where we
can witness the controversial slippages that
manifest among the complicated and nested
legal logics cum valuations that animate the
acceptance or condemnation of any genre.
The overlapping relations between war,
ḥamās, and collective performance are enough
to support the contingent and controversial
legal rulings that form the backbone of
Islamic debates about the value(s) of music.
Values do not simply emerge and interact
alone: they are motivated as part of discursive
projects by situated actors in order to deal
with the complex exigencies of everyday life.
Importantly, those motivated discourses help
shape the topographies of value that Islamic
scholars navigate. Differently valued “levels”
of a hierarchy may merge and shift within
discourses as they accrue the successive
sedimentations of historical deployment.
If hierarchies imply a “segmentation of
values,” then one such segmentation may be
revealed by bracketing certain universally
licit sonic practices within the Qur’ānic
hierarchy, such as military marches, and
revealing the contradictory values by
which they are rendered acceptable. While
practicality, function, benefit, or usefulness
may be relevant for some sonic practices, the
safeguarding of production (occupational
music) and reproduction (life-cycle music)
within Muslim communities may be for

others. Values may be so nested, and if
so, the logic of their partibility requires
investigation. Dumontian hierarchy provides
one avenue for this. It is worth noting that
Dumont’s approach may be especially well
suited for a conceptual hierarchy such as the
Qur’ānic one precisely because it does not
appear to map in any straightforward way to
social structure, as notions such as caste and
marginalization might.70 The link between
such conceptual hierarchies and social ones
seems decidedly more fraught with hazard,
though careful work here is a useful guide.71
Elaboration of a successful heuristic
confirms the value of the original
formulation. While the relational diagram
of a posited “Qur’ānic hierarchy” that I
presented here can be read alone, it should
be read as a complement to and elaboration
of al-Faruqi’s linear approach. Breaking
apart al-Faruqi’s continuum allows some
hidden aspects of the hierarchy to emerge.
At the same time, some aspects of the linear
model are obscured, such as the role of the
word or the presence of musical instruments.
Nevertheless, by drawing out some of the
latent “lower-value” dimensions of the
hierarchy I have pointed to the potential
for plural value schemes to exist within
the overwhelming importance of recitation
by explaining one aspect of one edge case:
military music. Other cross-cutting values
may be drawn out in a similar way. Building
on al-Faruqi’s approach can fruitfully explore
the historical and ongoing segmentation
of values within the Islamic tradition of
debate about music as a project based on
sophisticated legal logics of precedent and
analogy, as well as being deeply embedded
in the everyday.
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NOTES
1
The famous rebuke uttered by the Prophet’s
father-in-law and longtime follower Abū Bakr in an
equally famous ḥadīth. Abū Bakr admonished two
women of the ‘Anṣār singing in the presence of the
Prophet on a festival day by saying, “The horn-pipes
of Satan [mizāmir al-shayṭān] in the house of God’s
Prophet!” The Prophet’s reply: “Let them sing, O Abū
Bakr, verily to every nation there is a festival, and this
is our festival.”
2
See Janice Boddy, Wombs and Alien Spirits:
Women, Men, and the Zar Cult in Northern Sudan
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995) for
a deeper discussion of zār.
3
In this article and in my research more
generally, I only focus on the reception of Ibāḍī
jurisprudential rulings in the Interior province
of Oman, Dakhilliyah. Oman is by no means a
monocultural country, and various opinions and
traditions interact according to unique dynamics in
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